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ABSTRACT
Cooperative jamming is an approach that has been recently
proposed for improving physical layer based security for wire-
less networks in the presence of an eavesdropper. While the
source transmits its message to its destination, a relay node
transmits a jamming signal to create interference at the eaves-
dropper. In this paper, a scenario in which the relay is equipped
with multiple antennas is considered. A novel system design
is proposed for determining the antenna weights and trans-
mit power of source and relay, so that the system secrecy
rate is maximized subject to a total transmit power constraint,
or, the transmit power is minimized subject to a secrecy rate
constraint. Since the optimal solutions to these problems are
difficult to obtain, suboptimal closed-form solutions are pro-
posed that introduce an additional constraint, i.e., the com-
plete nulling of jamming signal at the destination.
Index Terms— physical layer security, secrecy rate, co-
operation, cooperative jamming
1. INTRODUCTION
Security is an important issue in wireless networks due to the
open wireless medium. Security against an eavesdropper is
typically achieved via cryptographic algorithms that are im-
plemented at higher network layers [1]. Physical (PHY) layer
based security, a line of work that has attracted considerable
recent attention in this context, exploits the physical charac-
teristics of the wireless channel to transmit messages securely
(see [2] for a review of recent developments in this area). The
idea was pioneered by Wyner, who introduced the wiretap
channel and established the possibility of creating perfectly
secure communication links without relying on private (se-
cret) keys [3]. Wyner showed that when an eavesdropper’s
channel is a degraded version of the main channel, the source
and destination can exchange perfectly secure messages at a
non-zero rate, while the eavesdropper can learn almost noth-
ing about the messages from its observations. The maximal
rate of perfectly secret transmission from the source to its in-
tended destination is named the secrecy rate. However, the
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feasibility of traditional PHY layer security approaches based
on single antenna systems is hampered by channel conditions:
absent feedback, if the channel between source and destina-
tion is worse than the channel between source and eavesdrop-
per, the secrecy rate is typically zero.
Some recent work has been proposed to overcome this
limitation by taking advantage of user cooperation [4]-[9].
For conventional wireless networks without secrecy constraints
(i.e., without eavesdropper), the most common strategy for
user cooperation is cooperative relaying, e.g., the well-known
decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward schemes. Co-
operative relaying with secrecy constraints was discussed in
[4]-[6]. Cooperative jamming is another approach to imple-
ment user cooperation for wireless networks with secrecy con-
straints [7]-[9]. In cooperative jamming, a relay transmits
a jamming signal at the same time when the source trans-
mits the message signal, with the purpose of jamming the
eavesdropper. Existing works on cooperative jamming have
focused primarily on the case of one single-antenna relay,
and on the analysis of secrecy rate and the capacity-achieving
strategy.
In this paper, we consider a different system model and
different design objectives for implementing cooperative jam-
ming. We consider a scenario in which a source communi-
cates with a destination in the presence of one eavesdropper.
The communication is aided by a relay that is equipped with
multiple antennas that provide more degrees of freedom for
the relay channel. Our goal is to assign weights to the an-
tenna elements in an optimum fashion, and also allocate the
power of source and relay in an optimum fashion. The weight
and power design problem is formulated as the following opti-
mization problem: (1) maximize achievable secrecy rate sub-
ject to a total transmit power constraint; or (2) minimize the
total transmit power subject to a secrecy rate constraint. We
assume that global channel state information (CSI) is avail-
able for system design. As the optimum design is in gen-
eral difficult, we consider a suboptimal weight design, i.e.,
to completely null out the jamming signal at the destination.
From the simulation results, cooperative jamming could sig-
nificantly improve the system performance especially when
the eavesdropper is close to the relay.
2. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
We consider a wireless network model consisting of one source,
one trusted relay1, one destination, and one eavesdropper. The
source, destination and eavesdropper are each equipped with
a single omni-directional antenna each, while the relay has
N > 1 omni-directional antennas2. All channels are as-
sumed to undergo flat fading. We denote by hSD the source-
destination channel, by hSE the source-eavesdropper chan-
nel, by hSR the source-relay channel (N × 1 column vector),
by hRD the relay-destination channel (N×1 column vector),
and by hRE the relay-eavesdropper channel (N × 1 column
vector). A narrowband message signal s is to be transmitted
from the source to the destination. The power of the message
signal s is normalized to unity, i.e, E{|s|2} = 1. The total
power budget for transmitting the message signal to its des-
tination is P . Thermal noise at any node is assumed to be
zero-mean white complex Gaussian with variance σ2.
2.1. Cooperative jamming
In cooperative jamming, while the source transmits, the relay
transmit a jamming signal that is independent of the source
message. The goal is to interfere with the eavesdropper’s
received signal. More specifically, the source transmits the
message signal
√
Pss, where Ps is the transmit power of the
source; at the same time, the relay transmits a weighted ver-
sion of a common jamming signal z, i.e., wz, where w is
the weight vector applied on the N antennas. The trans-
mit power budget for transmitting the jamming signal is thus
Pj = P − Ps.
The received signal at the destination equals
yd =
√
PshSDs+w
†
hRDz + nd , (1)
where nd represents white complex Gaussian noise at the des-
tination and (·)† represents the Hermitian transpose. The re-
ceived signal at the eavesdropper equals
ye =
√
PshSEs+w
†
hREz + ne , (2)
wherene represents white complex Gaussian noise at the eaves-
dropper.
2.2. Problem formulation
In the presence of an eavesdropper, secrecy rate is the figure
of merit to represent the maximal secrecy information rate one
can transmit from a source to its destination. Recall that the
secrecy rate is Rs = max {0, Rd −Re} where Rd is the rate
from the source to the destination and Re is the rate from the
source to the eavesdropper [3]. We consider the practical case
1We still adopt the name “relay”, though it is not used for relaying here.
2This can also be understood as multiple relays with one antenna each.
in which the system can be designed so that the secrecy rate
is positive. In that case, the secrecy rate can be simplified to
Rs = Rd−Re. From (1) and (2), the secrecy rate is given by
Rs = log2
(
1 +
Ps|hSD|2
|w†hRD|2 + σ2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Ps|hSE |2
|w†hRE |2 + σ2
)
. (3)
In the subsequent section we determine the relay weights
w and the power Ps based on the objectives: (i) maximize
secrecy rate subject to a transmit power constraint P0, or, (ii)
minimize the transmit power subject to a secrecy rate con-
straint R0s . We assume that global CSI is available for system
design (a common assumption in the PHY security literature),
even the eavesdropper’s channel are known. Information on
the eavesdropper’s channel can be obtained in cases where the
eavesdropper is active in the network and their transmissions
can be monitored. This is applicable particularly in networks
combining multicast and unicast transmissions, in which ter-
minals play dual roles as legitimate receivers for some signals
and eavesdroppers for others.
3. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section we address system design that maximizes the
secrecy rate subject to a total transmit power constraint P0
or minimize the total transmit power subject to a secrecy rate
constraint R0s . There are two aspects in system design: one
is to determine the optimal transmit power allocated to the
source and to relay; another is to design the optimal relay
weights. In the following, we first fix Ps to obtain the weights
for secrecy rate maximization or power minimization, and
then find the optimal value of Ps.
3.1. Secrecy rate maximization
From (3), it can be seen that the secrecy rate is a product
of two correlated generalized eigenvector problems and is in
general difficult to handle. To simplify the analysis, in the fol-
lowing we consider a suboptimal design. We add one more
constraint to completely null out the jamming signal at the
destination, i.e., w†hRD = 0. Then, the problem of secrecy
rate maximization can be formulated as
argmax
w
|w†hRE |2 (4)
s.t.
{
w
†
hRD = 0
‖w‖2 ≤ Pj
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the vector 2-norm. It is easy to show that
the inequality constraint (i.e., ‖w‖2 ≤ Pj) in (4) is equivalent
to the equality constraint ‖w‖2 = Pj by contradiction.
The Lagrangian of (4) is
L(w†, λ, η) = (2h†REw)hRE + λhRD + 2ηw (5)
where λ and η are Lagrange multipliers. As h†REw is a scalar,
by setting the Lagrangian to zero, we can see that w is a linear
combination of hRD and hRE , represented as
w = ahRD + bhRE . (6)
Substituting w into the two equality constraints in (4), we can
solve a and b. Notice that the values of a and b are not unique:
it is straightforward to see that, if w∗ is the solution of (4),
after rotating an arbitrary phase, ejθw∗ is still the solution
of (4). A possible selection is a = −√Pjµh†RDhRE and
b =
√
Pjµ‖hRD‖2 where
µ =
[
‖hRD‖4‖hRE‖2 − ‖hRD‖2|h†RDhRE |2
]−1/2
. (7)
Next, we find the optimal value of Ps. Noticing that the
above designed weight vector w is proportional to
√
Ps, let
us denote w by w =
√
Psv where
v = (−µh†RDhRE)hRD + (µ‖hRD‖2)hRE . (8)
Substituting it into the expression of Rs, the secrecy rate can
be expressed as a function of Ps:
Rs(Ps) = log2
(
e0 + e1Ps + e2P
2
s
f0 + f1Ps
)
(9)
where ei and fi are coefficients independent of Ps and given
by
e0 = σ
2(σ2 + P0|v†hRE |2) , (10)
e1 = (|hSD|2P0 − σ2)|v†hRE |2 + |hSD|2σ2 , (11)
e2 = −|hSD|2|v†hRE |2 , (12)
f0 = σ
2(σ2 + P0|v†hRE |2) , (13)
f1 = σ
2(|hSE |2 − |v†hRE |2) . (14)
Taking the derivative of 2Rs(Ps) and setting to zero, the
optimal value of Ps is the solution of the quadratic equation
e2f1(Ps)
2 + 2e2f0Ps + (e1f0 − e0f1) = 0 . (15)
In case no solution exists within (0, P0], it holds that Ps = P0
(i.e., the case of direct transmission without jamming).
3.2. Transmit power minimization
We again consider to completely null out the jamming signal
at the destination. For a fixed Ps, the problem of secrecy rate
maximization can be formulated as
argmin
w
‖w‖2 (16)
s.t.
{
w
†
hRD = 0
|w†hRE |2 ≥ ρ
where ρ = Ps|hRE|
2
2−R
0
s (1+Ps|hRD|2/σ2)−1
− σ2. By using the La-
grange multiplier method (similarly as in Section 3.1), it can
be shown that w is a linear combination of hRD and hRE ,
represented as w = ahRD + bhRE . A possible selection is
a = −µh†RDhRE and b = µ||hRD||2 where
µ =
√
ρ
‖hRD‖2‖hRE‖2 − |h†RDhRE |2
. (17)
Let us denote w = √ρv where
v =
−h†RDhREhRD + ‖hRD‖2hRE
‖hRD‖2‖hRE‖2 − |h†RDhRE |2
. (18)
Then, the total transmit power can be represented as
Ps + ‖w‖2 = e0 + e1Ps + e2P
2
s
f0 + f1Ps
(19)
where
e0 = −(2−R
0
s − 1)σ2‖v‖2 , (20)
e1 = 2
−R0
s − 1 + (|hSE |2 − 2−R
0
s |hSD|2)‖v‖2 ,(21)
e2 = 2
−R0
s |hSD|2/σ2 , (22)
f0 = 2
−R0
s − 1 , (23)
f1 = 2
−R0
s |hSD|2/σ2 . (24)
Then, the optimal value ofPs is obtained by solving the quadratic
equation which is of the same form as (15).
4. SIMULATIONS
For convenience, we consider a simple one-dimension sys-
tem model, as illustrated in Fig. 1, in which the source, re-
lay, destination and eavesdropper are placed along a line. To
highlight the effects of distances, channels are modeled by
a simple line-of-sight channel model including the path loss
(path loss exponent is 3.5) and a random phase (uniformly
distributed). The source-destination distance is fixed at 50 m,
and the source-relay distance is fixed at 25 m (i.e., the relay
is located at the middle point of source and destination). The
noise power σ2 is −100 dBm.
source destination
eavesdropper
relay
Fig. 1. Simulation model.
The position of the eavesdropper is varied so that the source-
eavesdropper distance varies from 10 m to 90 m. Fig. 2
shows the secrecy rate versus the source-eavesdropper dis-
tance for a transmit power constraint P0 ≤ −40 dBm. For
direct transmission without the relay’s help, the secrecy rate
is positive only if the source-eavesdropper distance is larger
than the source-destination distance. Also, the secrecy rate
of direct transmission increases with the increase of source-
eavesdropper distance, as the rate at the eavesdropper Rj de-
creases. For cooperative jamming, the closer the eavesdrop-
per is located to the relay, the higher the secrecy rate is. This is
because when relay and eavesdropper are close, even a small
amount of power allocated to the relay can create enough in-
terference at the eavesdropper, and a large amount of power
can be used for the source to transmit the message signal.
When the eavesdropper moves away from the relay and closer
to the source, the secrecy rate decreases, since more jam-
ming power is needed for creating larger interference and less
power is available for the source to transmit message signal.
When the eavesdropper moves away from both the relay and
source, it is interesting to see that the secrecy rate at first de-
creases, then increases, and eventually becomes equal to the
secrecy rate of direct transmission. This is because when the
eavesdropper is very far from the relay and the source, we
should spend most of the power on transmitting the message
signal. In that situation it is not worth spending a large amount
of power on the jamming signal, since the received power of
the message signal at the eavesdropper is always small (re-
gardless of jamming) due to the large path loss. Also, as ex-
pected, increasing the number of antennas of the relay N can
always improve the secrecy rate.
Fig. 3 shows the total transmit power versus the source-
eavesdropper distance for a secrecy rate constraint R0s ≥ 1
b/s/Hz. For the curve corresponding to direct transmission,
we only show the feasible region in which the required se-
crecy rate can be satisfied. The curves for cooperative jam-
ming exhibits similar characteristics to Fig. 2, therefore a de-
tailed discussion is omitted.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have addressed practical system design prob-
lems for the cooperative jamming protocol for secure wireless
communications in the presence of a relay with multiple an-
tennas. For cooperative jamming, while the the source trans-
mits its message signal, the relay transmits a jamming signal
to create interference at the eavesdropper. The multiple an-
tennas at the relay can provide degrees of freedom for the
relay channel and thus eliminate the effects of jamming sig-
nals at the destination. The objectives of our system design
are the secrecy rate maximization subject to a total power
constraint and the transmit power minimization subject to a
secrecy rate constraint. Simulation results show that cooper-
ative jamming could significantly improve the system perfor-
mance especially when the eavesdropper is close to the relay.
Future work includes the investigations of performance degra-
dation and system design in the presence of imperfect channel
estimates.
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